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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to study the effects of public debt management on yield curve spreads in Brazil, in order to see possible
impacts on the country’s economic activity. State space models, together with Kalman Filter estimators, are used for the period
ranging from June 2002 to February 2012. The results indicate that increases in the issuance of fixed rate linked bonds lead to
increases on yield spreads and the longer the maturity, the longer the effect. The opposite occurs when there is an increased issuance
of floating rate linked bonds. Therefore, a change in the structure of the Brazilian public debt is not neutral on the yield curve, with
possible impacts on the country’s macroeconomic balance.
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Resumo
O objetivo deste artigo é analisar os efeitos da administrac¸ão da dívida pública sobre os spreads dos títulos públicos brasileiro,
a fim de pensar em possíveis impactos sobre a atividade econômica. Para isso, utiliza-se a metodologia do Filtro de Kalman para o
período compreendido entre junho de 2002 e fevereiro de 2012. Os resultados indicam que aumentos da emissão de títulos prefixados
podem elevar o spread  e que esse efeito é maior nos vencimentos mais longos. Efeito contrário ocorre com o aumento da emissão
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os títulos indexados. Desta maneira, uma mudanc¸a na estrutura de financiamento da dívida pública não é neutra sobre a curva de
uros, podendo impactar a conduc¸ão da política monetária e o equilíbrio macroeconômico.
 2014 National Association of Postgraduate Centers in Economics, ANPEC. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. All rights
eserved.
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.  Introduction
There is no doubt every country needs funding to foster economic growth and development. However, such funding
eeds to be sustainable and it has to be closely in line with the government’s fiscal and monetary policies. That is why
anaging public debt is so crucial. According to Agell and Persson (1989) “public  debt  management  can  be  deﬁned
s the  government’s  (including  the  central  bank)  choice  regarding  the  composition  of  the  outstanding  stock  of  all  the
ecurities entering  the  liability  side  of  its  balance  sheet”.
In order to use public debt as part of an economic policy strategy, authorities can change a country’s debt portfolio
nd, as consequence, they can alter the demand for financial assets, which are not perfect substitutes. Therefore,
n effective public debt management is able to modify interest rate yield spread premiums and opportunity costs in
nancial decision-making. As a result, investors are provided with better information with which they can plan their
nvestments and create new portfolios that, consequently, may affect economic activity as a whole.
A great amount of economic literature has dealt with the research related to public debt management in a quite
ontroversial way. For instance, the so-called Ricardian Equivalence theory points out that public debt is neutral with
espect to consumption and, as result, with respect to macroeconomic dynamics, so long as agents allocate their savings
n order to have a permanent income over their entire lifetimes. In other words, a larger public debt leads to more savings
n the present period, because individuals expect to pay higher taxes in the future, which results in no effect in economic
ctivity. On the other hand, Tobin (1963) argues that economic activity can be influenced by public debt management,
s authorities can “determine  the  size  and  the  maturity  structure  of  debt  held  by  the  private  sector  and,  given  imperfect
ubstitutability of  assets  along  the  maturity  spectrum,  this  will  normally  inﬂuence  the  shape  of  the  yield  curve”  (Filardo
t al., 2012).
From an empirical point of view, public debt administration has been used as an economic policy instrument aiming
t different ends, such as the conduct of monetary policy, the public deficit financing, or even to provide hedge to
hose who borrow in foreign currency. The Operation Twist, which began in 1961, is one of the most well-known
ctions aimed at affecting US economy through public debt management. In that case, the Federal Reserve tried to
ompensate its higher short-term interest rate by shortening the maturity of the bonds to achieve lower premiums at
he long end of the yield curve. At that time, the focus was to avoid a deeper recession, improving the economy and
ringing down unemployment rate. The management of public debt has also been used to fight the consequences of
he recent global financial crisis. By means of the Quantitative Easing program and the revival of the Operation Twist,
he US Fed provided last resort liquidity to the financial system, and also stimulated aggregate demand.
As for the Brazilian case, the country has been through several changes in its debt management since the mid 2000s.
hree measures can be highlighted: (i) the reduction of securities linked to the Selic benchmark interest rate and to the
xchange rate; (ii) the lengthening of the country’s debt maturity; (iii) the issuance of external debt bonds denominated
n Reais. The purpose of the Brazilian government is twofold. On the one hand, it is trying to reduce the exposure of
ts public debt to adverse circumstances coming from either exchange rate devaluations or sudden interest rate hikes.
n the other hand, there has been a search for more efficient economic policies, which still suffer with problems from
he hyperinflation period of the late 1980s.
This paper analyses the effects of public debt management in Brazil on the country’s yield spread premiums. In
ther words, we examine the responsive behavior of bondholders to changes in the composition of the public debt. It is
his paper’s assumption that changes in the gap between the yields on short-term and long-term bonds affect individual
nvestment behavior and, as result, affect economic activity. In order to reach this objective, we make use of state space
odels, together with Kalman Filter estimators, for the period ranging from June 2002 to February 2012. The results
ndicate that increases in the issuance of fixed rate linked bonds lead to increases on yield spreads and the longer the
aturity, the longer the effect. The opposite outcome occurs when there is an increased issuance of floating rate linked
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bonds. Therefore, a change in the structure of the Brazilian public debt is not neutral on the yield curve, with possible
impacts on the country’s macroeconomic balance.
Besides this introduction, this paper is organized as follows. The Section 2 shows the main debates about public
debt management in Brazil, whilst the Section 3 describes the behavior of the Brazilian public debt from 1995 on.
Section 4 describes the data series, the descriptive statistics and the econometric model. The Section 5 is about the unit
root test results and the last two sections report the econometric results and the conclusions of the paper.
2.  Public  debt  management  in  Brazil:  a  literature  review
Garcia and Salomão (2006) emphasize the relationship between a country’s national debt and the systemic risk
premium required by investors. Due to the quality of the debt, its maturity and duration cannot increase regardless of
factors that buyers consider as non-diversifiable risks. In this scenario, attempting to lengthen the average maturity of
the outstanding debt would not be enough, as the voluntary demand for securities from the financial sector might not
meet government’s expectations. The author argues that a successful lengthening of public debt would only be possible
if measures were taken to strengthen the domestic financial market. Among the measures, we could list the reduction
of foreign currency-denominated debt, fiscal stability to reduce the Debt/GDP ratio, controlled inflation, as a means of
helping the central bank lower interest rates, besides helping diminish the importance of floating rate securities in the
total debt.
Levy (2006) called the attention to the actions taken by the Brazilian Treasury aiming at improving the country’s
debt profile. Two main measures were taken: (i) the issuance of exchange rate linked bonds was diminished; (ii) the
investor base was diversified and expanded, attracting more domestic and mainly foreign bondholders, contributing to
the improvement in systemic risk perception.
In another line of research, Arida et al. (2005), Lara Resende (2006) e Arida (2006), among others, called the
attention to the risk of jurisdictional uncertainty in Brazil. Arida et al. (2005), for instance, argue that the inexistence of
a local long-term domestic credit market could be seen as a market failure, which required some sort of governmental
intervention, such as: restrictions to currency convertibility, artificial lengthening of public debt maturities, compulsory
saving funds, and distorting taxation. According to the authors, these interventions worsen the negative impact of
jurisdictional uncertainty on the short-term interest rate in Brazil. Therefore, a change in this scenario would open
some room for a composition of debt with a better quality. Hence, improving the country’s macroeconomic fundamentals
would be crucial to lessening risk perception in Brazil.
Accordingly, Lara Resende (2006) explained that forced changes in the government’s debt profile, with no alterations
in risk perception, would not be beneficial to a proper debt management. This could be so because, in times of financial
difficulties, investors interested in fixed rate bonds would require higher yields, as opposed to floating rate bondholders.
Pastore (1996, 2006) highlighted the ineffectiveness of monetary policy when floating rate linked bonds represent
a significant share of public debt. The reason for that relates to the absence of the so-called wealth effect. When there
are a lot of floating rate linked securities, interest rate variations do not lead to wealth loss and, thus, may not limit
demand. According to the author, when investors construct their portfolios with a lot of sovereign debt, and when the
government issues a lot of (high) interest-rate linked securities, the wealth effect may be an efficient monetary policy
transmission channel. Nevertheless, this is not the case whenever public debt is mostly comprised of floating rate
securities (Pastore, 1996, 2006). It is important to stress that, in general, the wealth effect has been losing relevance as
a monetary policy channel, as stressed by the empirical evidences found by Ludvigson et al. (2002) and by Pires and
Andrade (2009) for the Brazilian case.
Carneiro (2006) argues that floating rate linked bonds are closely related to higher interest rates in Brazil. The reason
for that is the opportunity cost that floating rate securities have in relation to either inflation-rate or fixed rate bonds.
As floating rate bonds are not influenced by price variations, when interest rates change, monetary policy becomes
ineffective. Therefore, modifications in debt composition, resulted from a reduction in the issuance of floating rate
securities, would make monetary policy more potent. Certainly, the financial system would become more susceptible
to short-run changes in monetary policy, but on the other hand, interest rates would be lower, helping economic growth.A third field of contribution concerns the construction of an ascending yield curve in the Brazilian financial system,
which may provide more efficiency to monetary policy and allow the private sector to fight for a greater portion of
the national savings (Kawall et al., 2004). Moraes (2006) points out that due to a period of great instability of the
Brazilian economy, long-term asset pricing would still take into account a large variation of inflation, resulting in a
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ery short-run long side of the yield curve. The author suggests that, as the Selic rate decreases, the Brazilian Treasury
ught to issue fixed rate long-term bonds in order to flatten the term-structure of the interest rates.
Franco (2005) also emphasizes the effects of floating rate securities on the development of private long-term debt,
nd how public debt management could contribute to that. In order to reach this goal, the Brazilian money market
ould have to go through reforms, paying lower returns to the excess of liquidity and, at the same time, bringing some
olatility to the Selic rate. As a result, investors would respond to this increased volatility migrating to medium and
ong maturity floating rate bonds. Besides, Franco (2005) advises that the Brazilian Central Bank should be able to set
ts benchmark interest rate for a longer period than one day.
Loyo (2006) suggests that the construction of a yield curve in the Brazilian financial system could become viable if
he National Treasury issued long-term floating rate bonds, with higher returns, and in the meantime the Central Bank
ecreased the Selic rate, bringing more volatility to this rate. This procedure, says Loyo (2006), might help construct a
erm structure of the interest rate more compatible with those found in countries with well-developed financial systems.
n these conditions, how could monetary policy help public debt management in order to create a positive yield curve
n Brazil? Loyo (2006) argues that Franco’s (2005) assumption, regarding an increase in the volatility of the Brazilian
enchmark Selic interest rate, could raise some doubts once the decrease in demand for higher volatility securities might
ot mean an increase in other financial assets.1 In this sense, Loyo (2006) says that a successful lengthening of public
ebt would involve a great deal of uncertainty reduction regarding monetary policy action. Therefore, the Brazilian
entral Bank would have to target inflation as well as interest rate stability and, as soon as investors incorporated
hese variables to their risk assessment, the lengthening of debt maturity would become feasible. Notwithstanding,
oyo (2006) suggests that monetary policy should keep its benchmark interest rate constant around its neutral rate,
nd maintain small but persistent deviations, rather than large shocks. This would motivate agents to agree to lengthen
heir investments and improving the debt profile.
Mendonc¸a and Silva (2008) analyze the relationship between monetary policy focused on a disinflationary process
nd fiscal equilibrium. The authors argue that when interest rates are high and public debt consists mainly of interest
ate-linked bonds, the conduct of fiscal policy would be compromised, due to expensive financial costs to the public
udget. Therefore, an effective public debt management would be a good strategy to lessen fiscal policy costs and an
dequate tool to avoid deterioration in the Debt/GDP ratio.
.  Public  debt  management  in  Brazil  after  1995
Although the econometric analysis, which will be performed in this paper, goes from 2002 to 2012 due to data
vailability, this descriptive analysis starts in 1995, as an attempt to show a more complete scenario and a more
obust foundation to the trajectory of the Brazilian public indebtedness. Moreover, the analysis will focus on the
acroeconomic determinants of debt performance in Brazil but also on the actions taken by the government to manage
he country’s public debt, mainly regarding its composition and maturity.
The period ranging from July/1994 to January/1999 marks a monetary regime based on the exchange rate as an
nchor, i.e., a source of nominal rigidity to other prices. At that time, Brazilian economic authorities used to attract
oreign capital flows by managing the country’s public debt as an instrument for hedging against the exchange rate
isk. In addition to that, the Central Bank raised its benchmark Selic rate to attract even more external savings. As a
onsequence, the share of Selic-indexed securities increased from 20.46% of the public debt, in 1997, to 61.51% in
999. At the same time, the share of exchange rate linked securities went from 11.64% to 26.06%, as depicted in Fig. 1.
In 1998, the Brazilian government adopted a target for the primary surplus to guide its fiscal policy and, in 1999,
n inflation targeting system was implemented in substitution to the exchange rate anchor, restoring macroeconomic
tability. According to Pedras (2009), the new fiscal policy orientation, aimed at reducing Debt/GDP ratio in the
edium term, made feasible the issuance of inflation-linked securities, in order to meet potential demand from pensionunds, and also to allow for the lengthening of the Brazilian public debt. In 2002, however, uncertainties concerning
residential elections made investors become more skeptical about the Brazilian economy, as they believed fiscal
ominance would become a problem if the Labor Party won the elections (Favero and Giavazzi, 2005). Nonetheless,
1 Bartolini and Prati (2003) contributed to this line of research by interviewing open market brokers. For more on the topic, the reader may refer
o Bartolini and Prati (2003).
178 C.G. da Silva et al. / EconomiA 15 (2014) 174–188Fig. 1. Federal public debt profile (% of total debt, Jan/1995–Dec/2012).
Source: Brazilian National Treasury.
as the new government sworn in, it pursued credible policies, with more restrictive fiscal and monetary policies. With
these actions, the government was able to recover its credibility, reducing sovereign risk and inflation, stabilizing the
exchange rate, and controlling public debt dynamics (Bresser-Pereira and Gomes da Silva, 2008).
Since then, the National Treasury has promoted improvements in public debt management, which was something
necessary to do, once the share of interest-rate linked bonds reached 60% of total debt in 2002, as shown in Fig. 1.
There is no doubt this debt profile caused some problems. Firstly, the benchmark interest rate would partially lose its
power as a demand control tool, compromising the conduct of monetary policy, just as mentioned by Pastore (1996,
2006) and Carneiro (2006). Secondly, a high share of interest-rate linked bonds also meant large financial costs, which
was a serious problem to the conduct of fiscal policy (Mendonc¸a and Silva, 2008). In line with Levy’s (2006) proposal,
the government exempted all foreign investors from paying capital-gains taxes on federal bonds, in 2006. This measure
paved the way for Brazil to issue its first 10-year fixed rate bond2 (Pedras, 2009).
From 2008 onwards, the international financial crises forced the government to take a more prudent position
regarding the conduct of economic policy. In the beginning of the crisis, the share of fixed rate linked bonds (as a %
of total debt) decreased and the shared of floating rate bonds increased, as investors demanded more security on their
investments. Besides that, the Brazilian government worked to improve its debt profile and, as a result, floating rate
linked securities, mainly those linked to the Selic rate and exchange rate, went from nearly 90% of the total debt, in
April 2003, to 34.5% in April 2012. In the opposite direction, the sum of fixed rate and inflation-rate linked bonds,
which made public debt management and fiscal policy considerably more predictable, totaled 65.5% of public debt. It
is also worth mentioning, as depicted in Fig. 1, the reduction of the share of exchange rate linked bonds, after 2002.
This happened due to the better outcome of the Brazilian current account, from 2004 on.
Fig. 2 summarizes the Brazilian public debt trajectory from December 1995 until December 2012. As Arida (2006)
and Lara Resende (2006) argued, it is clear that between the emergence of the Brazilian external crisis, in 1999, and
Lula da Silva’s first year in office, there was an increase in investors’ systemic risk perceptions. Consequently, the
demand for floating rate linked bonds also raised. However, it was only after 2003 that investors decided to hold more
fixed rate debt securities. Since 2011, there has been a more prominent replacement of floating rate securities by fixed
rate ones.
Two National Monetary Council (CMN) Resolutions are worth mentioning, once their objectives is to align the
agents’ investment policy to the guidelines established by the National Treasury, of gradually reducing the share of
floating rate bonds. The first one is CMN Resolution 3922/2010, which regulates investments of reserves for closed
complementary retirement plans. Investments of pension plans for the Federal Government, States, Federal District
and Municipalities have to comply with this resolution, investing at least part of their resources in fixed rate securities,
instead of Selic Rate linked ones. Secondly, Resolution 4034/2011, which regulates the investment of open plan assets,
2 They are the National Treasury Notes, F series, 2017.
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ource: Brazilian National Treasury.
he so-called extra-market funds of state-owned companies, semi-autonomous agencies and government funds. Finally,
t is also worth mentioning the issuance of fixed rate securities to the Brazilian Indemnity Severance Fund (FGTS),
n exchange of floating rate LFT bonds, the Treasury Financial Bills. This measure amounted to almost R$ 40 billion
STN, 2012).
Fig. 3 depicts the lengthening of federal public debt average maturity. The first impulse dates back of 1999, the
bandonment of the exchange-rate anchor, because there was no longer a need to attract foreign savings and, therefore,
o need to issue the same amount of short-term public debt. After this first impulse, debt maturity was relatively stable
ntil 2006, reflecting government efforts to obtain credibility to its economic policy and, at the same time, attract more
nvestors to buy fixed rate linked securities. From 2007 on, when the share of floating rate linked bonds started to be
educed, and the share of fixed rate bonds started to increase, the average debt maturity reached 36 months (Pedras,
009). In 2011, the lengthening of debt average maturity picked up again, in line with a more intense substitution of
oating rate securities for fixed rate or inflation-linked bonds.
In summary, it can be noted that after going through periods of crises and instability, from 1998 to 2003, which
ade it difficult to manage the country’s public debt in the long-term, there was some improvement after 2003. In fact,
he debt management strategy, taken by Brazilian Treasury and Central Bank, was focused on stabilizing the share of
oating rate linked bonds (as % of total debt) and, at the same time, on increasing the share of fixed rate securities. The
enefits were clear as, in less than a decade, the issuance of fixed rate linked securities increased, and so the average
ebt maturity. Finally, although we cannot yet say that there is a term structure of interest rates in Brazil, given the
verage debt maturity of about four years, the scenario is much better than in mid-2003 and 2004. At that time, the
hare of fixed rate linked securities was small and the average debt maturity was about two years. Thus, considering
he debt management strategy described in this article, it is of utmost importance to analyze how agents respond to
Fig. 3. Domestic federal public debt: average maturity (in months, Jan/1997–Dec/2012)*.
ource: Central Bank of Brazil.
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changes in the country’s public debt composition, and how these possible changes can affect economic activity. The
next sections will search for some answers.
4.  Econometric  methodology,  data  and  descriptive  statistics
The econometric methodology applied in this article is related to state-space structural models and Kalman filtering,
which is a recursive linear filter capable of predicting the unobservable variable, in the next period, based on the current
observation. After that, the filter uses the realization to update the forecast.3 The advantage of this method is the analysis
of unobservable components, such the trend and cycle of a series, allowing them to be incorporated in the model. State-
space models consist of two equations: measurement and transition. The former describes the relationship between
observed and unobserved variables, whereas the latter describes the dynamics of the unobserved variables. Once the
representation is set, the Kalman Filter is the statistical algorithm that will carry out the computation of the model
(Pasricha, 2006).
A general univariate model can be described as:
yt =  μt +  γt +  ψt +  νt +  εt εt∼NID  (0,  σ2ε ),  t  =  1,  . . ., T.  (1)
where μt is the trend component, γ t is the seasonal component, Ψ t is the cycle, νt is the autoregressive component and
εt is the error term.
The trend component can be defined as:
μt =  μt−1 +  βt−1 +  ηt,  ηt∼NID  (0,  σ2η) (2)
βt =  βt−1 +  ςt,  ςt∼NID  (0,  σ2ς) (3)
where βt is the slope, ηt and ςt are level and slope perturbations, respectively, and they are, together with εt, mutually
uncorrelated.
As in Shumway and Stoffer (2000), suppose a univariate series yt consisting of a trend component (μt), which
follows a random walk process, and a noise component (εt). We then obtain a local level model such that:
yt =  μt +  εt εt∼NID  (0,  σ2ε ),  t  =  1,  . . ., T.
μt =  μt−1 +  ηt,  ηt∼NID  (0,  σ2η)
(4)
The aim is to produce estimators for μt, given YS = {y1, . .  ., ys}. This solution is given by the Kalman Filter. Suppose:
xSt =  E(xt|YS) (5)
PSt1,t2 =  E{(xt1 −  xSt1)(xt2 −  xSt2)
′}  (6)
When t1 = t2, we can define PSt . The initial conditions are: x00 =  E(x0|Y0) =  μ  and P00 =  0, for t = 1,.  .  .,n:
xt−1t =  xt−1t−1 (7)
Pt−1t =  Pt−1t−1 +  σ2η (8)
with:
xtt =  xt−1t +  K(yt −  xt−1t ) (9)
Ptt =  [I  −  Kt]Pt−1t (10)Equation Kt =  Pt−1t [Pt−1t +  σ2ε ]
−1 is called the Kalman Gain and it is responsible for updating yt when the
information is updated.4
3 See Harvey (1990) and Hamilton (1994) for more on the topic.
4 See Shumway and Stoffer (2000) for more details. The SSF/Stamp software was used to run all the regressions in this article (Koopman et al.,
2009).
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Table 1
Descriptive statistics (118 obs).
Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev.
Yield spread (1 month) 0.03 0.005 1.50 Dec/2002 −0.84 Aug/2003 0.36
Yield spread (3 months) 0.08 0.01 3.47 Oct/2002 −2.07 Jul/2003 0.91
Yield spread (6 months) 0.21 0.06 5.68 Aug/2002 −3.18 Jul/2003 1.58
Yield spread (12 months) 0.51 0.12 10.01 Nov/2002 −4.31 Jul/2003 2.47
Yield spread (48 months) 1.73 0.66 22.41 Oct/2002 −3.83 Jun/2003 4.85
Yield spread (60 months) 1.90 0.92 24.38 Oct/2002 −4.00 Oct/2005 5.22
GDP gap 0.000348 0.00 0.05 −0.04 0.018
Monthly IPCA inflation 0.52 0.43 2.88 −0.03 0.38
Monthly Selic interest rate (annualized) 14.62 13.26 26.32 8.65 4.57
Floating rate linked bonds (%) 0.018 −0.005 7.94 −11.76 2.37
Fixed rate linked bonds (%) 1.40 1.09 12.77 21.19 3.88
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The econometric estimations will be carried out by making use of monthly series for the period ranging from January
002 to December 2012. The variables are defined as follow:
 Output (GDP) Gap, which is the log of monthly GDP (seasonally adjusted)5 (Source: National Bureau of Statistics
– IBGE);
 Monthly CPI (IPCA) Inflation (Source: National Bureau of Statistics – IBGE);
 Monthly Selic Interest Rate – Annualized (Central Bank of Brazil);
 Financial Treasury Bills – LFTs (in BRL) (Brazilian National Treasury);
 National Treasury Bills – LTNs (in BRL) (Brazilian National Treasury);
 Yield Spreads – Pre-DI Swap 1, 3, 6, 12, 48 and 60 months (Bloomberg);
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics. As expected, the average yield spread increases over time, 0.03 (1 month)
o 1.90 (60 months). The same upward trend is observed in the median and maximum values of the yield spreads,
hich occurred between August and December 2002. As for the minimum values, they are also located in a given
eriod, between June and August 2003. The exception is for the 60-month spread (October 2005). Regarding the other
ariables, their maximums and minimums follow, basically, the same pattern found in the yield spreads.
.1.  Measurement  of  yield  spread  and  the  Kalman  Filter
It is important, at this point, to make an explanation about the procedure used to calculate the yield spread of all the
eries used in the article. In order to measure the effect of public debt management on the term structure of interest
ates it is essential to decompose the yield curve in two components: level and spread. The latter can be defined as
 proxy for the risk premium required by those investing in public securities. The spread ϕt between short-term and
ong-term interest rates can be decomposed in two equations (measurement and transition)6:Measurement equation : iSwapPre,t =  it +  ϕt +  ξt (11)
State equation : ϕt =  ϕt−1 +  εt (12)
5 The monthly series was obtained via Boot et al. (1967) methodology. The authors make use of an ad-hoc mathematical procedure in order to
onstruct synthetic quarterly data based on past annual data. The construction of the series is based on a least-square methodology, with the following
teps: (i) based on the annual data, a forecast is made for the current year; (ii) An OLS technique is applied in order to derive a smooth continuous
uarterly data from the annual data. Xt is the quarterly estimate for quarter ‘t’; Ay is the annual estimate for year ‘y’; β is the last year for which there
s available data. Thus: min (x1. . .x4y)
∑4y
t=2[Xt − Xt−1]2, t ∈ {1, . . .(4β + 1)} t ∈ {1, . . .(β + 1)}, under the restriction that:
∑4y
t=4y−3Xt = A.
t means that the sum of the quarterlized series is equal to the observed anual data (Bloem et al., 2003).
6 The reader may refer to Commandeur and Koopman (2007) and Asemota (2010) for more details related to the procedure.
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where iSwap-Pre,t is the Pre-DI Swap fixed rate, maturing on 1, 3, 6, 12, 48 and 60 months’ time; it is the Selic interest
rate; ϕt measures how the spread varies over time (the assumption is that it is a random walk process); ξt is the error
term, with zero mean and constant variance, which captures the effects of disturbances on the slope of the curve; εt
captures the effects of shocks on the yield spread, such as a change in investors profile or their aversion to risks related
to inflation or interest rate.
Fig. 4 reports the behavior of the yield spread premiums over the treasury yield curve. One can notice that, as expected,
the volatility risk premium is always higher on the long end of the yield curve. This shows that, in the long run, investors
become more risk averse when there is expectation of a rise in inflation and interest rates, when compared to the short-
run perceptions of aggregate economic conditions. As the short-term investor feels more protected by investing in
short-maturity securities, the yield spread premium required to justify the risk of investing in such securities is less
volatile. In this sense, it is worth mentioning the high yield spread volatility, observed in 2002 and 2003, related to the
Pre-DI swap with longer maturities. This was in response to the perceived weakness of the Brazilian economy at that
time. Another period of volatility, much less severe than what happened in 2002–2004, was observed in 2009, due to
the global the financial crisis.
Fig. 4 also shows important information related to the relationship between debt management and the behavior of
yield spread. In fact, after 2005, investors seemed to be more confident with the way the Brazilian government dealt
with its public debt. At the same time, the reduction of floating rate linked bonds, especially after 2010, resulted in
lower spread volatility, when compared to the previous period. This meant less variance of the term structure of interest
rates and more public debt stability, due to the increase in the issuance of fixed rate linked bonds.
Moreover, the coordination between monetary and fiscal policies, with targets for both inflation and primary surplus,
meant that even inflation indexed bonds were not able to bring volatility to the long-term yield spread after 2010.
5.  Unit  root  tests
The next step requires the estimation of ADF and KPSS7 unit root tests for all series. The results are reported in
Table 2 and show that all variables are stationary, with some exceptions, such as the GDP gap and IPCA inflation
rate. In relation to the latter, for instance, there is a sharp rise in inflation between 2002 and 2003, which could have
influenced the outcome of its unit root test. Thus, in order to verify the influence of structural breaks we will make use
of Clemente et al. (1998) procedure.8Clemente et al. (1998), as argued in Baum (2005), propose a unit root test that extends Perron and Vogelsang’s
(1992) statistics and account for the possibility of two structural breaks within two types of events: either additive (AO)
7 See Dickey & Fuller (1979) and Kwiatkowski et al. (1992) for more details.
8 See Gomes da Silva and Vieira (2013) for more details related to the test.
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Table 2
Unit root tests.
ADF KPSS
Test stats Reject H0
Unit root
Test stats Reject H0
No unit root
5% 10% 5% 10%
GDP gap −2.79 No Yes 0.19 No No
Monthly IPCA inflation −3.57 Yes Yes 0.44 Yes No
Yield spread (1 month) −4.26 Yes Yes 0.14 No No
Yield spread (3 months) −6.04 Yes Yes 0.14 No No
Yield spread (6 months) −4.98 Yes Yes 0.15 No No
Yield spread (12 months) −4.26 Yes Yes 0.16 No No
Yield spread (48 months) −3.73 Yes Yes 0.27 No No
Yield spread (60 months) −3.56 Yes Yes 0.29 No No
Floating rate linked bonds (%) −8.62 Yes Yes 0.31 No No
Fixed rate linked bonds (%) −4.78 Yes Yes 0.13 No No
A
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t
(
(
n
T
o
a
o
m
(DF critical values: −2.88 (5%); −2.58 (10%); KPSS critical values: 0.46 (5%); 0.34 (10%).
ote: Estimations with constant only.
r innovational (IO) outliers. The first one deals with a sudden change in the series, whereas the second one deals with
 gradual shift in the mean of the series.9
The null hypothesis tested by Clemente et al. (1998) is given by:
H0 : yt =  yt−1 +  δ1DTB1t +  δ2DTB2t +  ut (13)
The alternative hypothesis is:
HA : yt =  μ  +  d1DU1t +  d2DU2t +  et (14)
We can see that DTBit is a pulse variable assuming the value 1 if t  = TBi + 1 and 0 otherwise. Also, DUit = 1 if t >  TBi
or i = 1, 2 and 0 otherwise. TB1 and TB2 are the time periods when the mean is modified. The authors suppose for
implicity that TBi = λiT  for i  = 1, 2 with 0 < λi <  1  and λ2 > λ1.
The unit root hypothesis can be tested by estimating the following model for the case in which the two breaks belong
o the innovational outlier (IO):
yt =  μ  +  ρyt−1 +  δ1DTB1t +  δ2DTB2t +  d1DU1t +  d2DU2t +
k∑
i=1
ciyt−i +  et (15)
The next step is to obtain the minimum value of the pseudo t-ratio for testing whether the autoregressive parameter
ρ) is 1 for all the break time combinations. The derivation of the asymptotic distribution of this statistic, Clemente et al.
1998) assume that 0 < λ0 <  λ1 and λ2 < 1 −  λ0 < 1, implying that the test is not defined at the sample limits and it is
ecessary to choose some trimming value (λ0), and also λ1 and λ2 takes the values in the interval [(k  + 2)T, (T  −  1)/T].
he authors impose one additional restriction, λ2 >  λ1 + 1, in order to eliminate cases of consecutive time breaks.10
The unit root null hypothesis to test for two structural breaks, when the shifts are better represented as addictive
utliers (AO), is developed by a two-step procedure. The first one is to remove the deterministic part of the variable
nd estimate the following model:
yt =  d1DU1t +  d2DU2t +  y˜t (16)9 See Perron (1989), Banerjee et al. (1992), Christiano (1992), Zivot and Andrews (1992), Perron (1997) or Vogelsang and Perron (1998) as part
f the literature on structural break tests for breaking trend variables and Perron (1990) and Perron and Vogelsang (1992) when only a shift in the
ean is present. See also Lee and Strazicich (2003) for an endogenous two-break LM unit root test.
10 See Eq. (4) in Clemente et al. (1998) for further details on the expression for the distribution of the innovational outlier (IO) statistics
min tIO
ρˆ
(λ1, λ2).
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Table 3
Unit root tests (two structural breaks).
AR(k) Test stats 1st break D1t (coefficient) 2nd break D2t (coefficient)
GDP gap 7 −0.214a Sep 2004 (−0.014)a Oct 2010 (0.0089)a
Monthly IPCA inflation 6 −0.56a Mar 2003 (−0.87)a Feb 2005 (−0.12)a
Pre-DI swap spread (1 month) 8 −0.23a Dec 2002 (−1.30)a Apr 2004 (0.19)a
Pre-DI swap spread (3 months) 11 −0.25a Dec 2002 (−3.53)a Jan 2004 (0.64)a
Pre-DI swap spread (6 months) 7 −0.11a Dec 2002 (−6.17)a Mar 2004 (0.97)a
Pre-DI swap spread (12 months) 7 −0.10a Dec 2002 (−9.59)a Mar 2004 (1.20)a
Pre-DI swap spread (48 months) 9 −0.20a Dec 2002 (−18.02)a Oct 2007 (1.62)a
Pre-DI swap spread (60 months) 9 −0.18a Dec 2002 (−19.06)a Oct 2007 (1.54)a
Floating rate linked bonds (%) 0 −0.88a Nov 2005 (−2.51)a Sep 2006 (1.50)a
Fixed rate linked bonds (%) 4 −1.01a Feb 2003 (8.03)a Apr 2007 (−2.71)a
Source: National Bureau of Statistics (IBGE), Bloomberg, Central Bank of Brazil.
Note:
a Rejection of H0 at 5%. “clemao2” command used (Addictive Outlier) – Stata 11.
The second step is to test the hypothesis of ρ  = 1 and search for the minimal t-ratio in the following model:
y˜t =
k∑
i=1
ω1iDTB1t−i +
k∑
i=1
ω2iDTB2t−i +  ρy˜t−1 +
k∑
i=1
ciy˜t−i +  et (17)
where y˜t are the residuals obtained from equation (15), DTBit are dummy variables included in equation (16) to assure
that min tAOρˆ (λ1,  λ2) converges to the distribution described in Eq. (4) of Clemente et al. (1998).11 The idea is to run a
regression of the residuals on their lagged values, a number of lagged differences, and a set of dummy variables needed
to make the distribution of the test statistic tractable.12
Table 3 summarizes the results and shows that there is rejection of the null, i.e., all series are stationary. The two
breaks estimated are located at the end of 2002 (first break) and beginning of 2004 (second break). As for the Brazilian
GDP, the second break is in 2010, which coincides with the international financial crisis, which began in 2008. In the
case of inflation, the first break coincides with the inflationary impact of the confidence crisis, between 2002 and 2003.
6.  Determinants  of  yield  spreads:  model  and  results
Now, we can focus on the main purpose of this article, which is to analyze the effects of public debt on yield
spread premiums required by investors, when purchasing (fixed and/or floating rate) bonds with different maturities,
as a means of understanding how agents behave when debt composition changes. Given this scenario, we can think of
possible effects of debt management on the country’s economic activity.
The measurement equation can be defined as follows:
Spreadi,t =  βtGDPGapt−k +  αtIPCAt−k +  δtFixedRateXt−k +  ρtFloatRatet−s +  εi,t (18)
where Spreadi,t represents the yield spreads related to 1, 3, 6, 12, 48 and 60 months. It means that for each yield spread,
there will be an estimation with 2 lags13 taking also into consideration the output gap, inflation (IPCA), and the interest
rate on fixed and floating rate bonds.
The state equation can be defined as:βi,t =  βi,t−1 +  εβit ,  σβi ≡  st.dev  (σβi ) (19)
where ‘i’ represents the time-varying parameter to be estimated, which follow a random walk process.
11 See Tables 1 and 2 of Clemente et al. (1998) finite sample critical values and the asymptotic distribution of the IO and AO statistics for 10,000
replications.
12 The value of the minimal t-ratio is compared with critical values provided by Perron and Vogelsang (1992), as they do not follow the standard
Dickey–Fuller distribution.
13 Choosing two lags was necessary in order to solve the problem of autocorrelation found in the models estimated with only one lag.
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Table 4
Estimation results (final state estimates).
Spread Spread 3 Spread 6 Spread 12 Spread 48 Spread 60
1 month 2 months 3 months 12 months 48 months 60 months
GDP Gapt 0.00127 (0.94) 0.00275 (0.95) 0.03302 (0.63) 0.06494 (0.54) −0.04861 (0.82) −0.03418 (0.88)
GDP Gapt−1 0.00801 (0.66) 0.04383 (0.38) 0.09274 (0.22) 0.10841 (0.33) 0.05794 (0.80) 0.01151 (0.96)
GDP Gapt−2 0.05889 (0.00) 0.14719 (0.00) 0.20796 (0.01) 0.30568 (0.00) 0.46122 (0.04) 0.4867 (0.05)
IPCAt 0.06289 (0.11) 0.15176 (0.14) 0.42373 (0.01) 1.08817 (0.00) 1.99914 (0.00) 1.98233 (0.00)
IPCAt−1 0.21821 (0.00) 0.55486 (0.00) 0.72454 (0.00) 0.89065 (0.00) 2.25594 (0.00) 2.33705 (0.00)
IPCAt−2 −0.00888 (0.84) −0.15918 (0.18) −0.17133 (0.36) −0.21239 (0.45) −0.23244 (0.69) −0.09529 (0.88)
FixedRatet −0.00305 (0.37) −0.00285 (0.74) −0.0002 (0.98) 0.01371 (0.51) 0.06801 (0.12) 0.07018 (0.13)
FixedRatet−1 0.00585 (0.10) 0.02768 (0.01) 0.05605 (0.00) 0.09396 (0.00) 0.18797 (0.00) 0.20596 (0.00)
FixedRatet−2 −0.00008 (0.97) 0.00465 (0.56) 0.02038 (0.10) 0.02118 (0.26) 0.0031 (0.93) −0.00172 (0.96)
FloatRatet −0.01085 (0.04) −0.01866 (0.17) −0.02589 (0.23) −0.07594 (0.02) −0.2234 (0.00) −0.23459 (0.00)
FloatRatet−1 −0.01031 (0.06) −0.02012 (0.15) −0.03406 (0.13) −0.08353 (0.01) −0.19986 (0.01) −0.21483 (0.01)
FloatRatet−2 −0.01124 (0.02) −0.01037 (0.41) −0.0097 (0.62) −0.04677 (0.12) −0.17363 (0.01) −0.18289 (0.07)
R2 0.899 0.893 0.903 0.907 0.898 0.898
N
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Sote: p-value in parenthesis. Number of observations = 118.
Table 4 reports the estimation results. First of all, we notice that both short-term and long-term yield spreads have
 statistically significant relationship (in the second lag) with the Brazilian economic activity (measured by the output
ap) and they increase as maturity increases. The same applies to the IPCA inflation, which is statistically significant
ith one lag. It means that changes in yield spreads can be explained by expected changes in economic activity, and
he higher the gap between actual and potential products, the greater the demand for protection. The same reasoning
pplies to inflation: the more agents are inclined to believe that prices will go up, the higher the yield spread required.
Nevertheless, our main aim is to examine how agents respond to changes in the profile of government securities
long the yield curve, i.e., the behavior of agents to changes in public debt. When we look at the fixed rate bonds, we
otice that there is no statistical significance at lag 0 (FixedRatet) and lag 2 (FixedRatet−2). On the other hand, at the
rst lag the results show that an increase in issuance of fixed rate bonds may also increase the yield spread, and the
onger the maturity the greater the effect. The coefficient ranges from 0.00585 for the one-month spread up to 0.20596
or the 60-month spread. As for floating rate securities, the effects are more significant for the yield spread at the first
ag (FloatRatet−1), in which the coefficient ranges from −0.01031 to −0.21483. The negative sign is an indication that
he effect is opposite to what happened with the fixed rate bonds, i.e., an increase in the issuance of floating rate bonds
eads to a reduction of yield spread.
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Fig. 5. Effects of securities issuance (fixed rate linked bonds) on yield spread premiums (final state – 1 lag).
ource: Results reported in Table 4.
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Figs. 5 and 6 summarize the main results reported on Table 4. In general, both in the case of floating rate and
fixed rate linked bonds, yield spreads premiums vary the most for longer maturities. However, the most important
difference relates to the sign of the yield spread required by investors: in the case of fixed rate bonds, the spread rises as
maturity increases. As for the case of floating rate bonds the opposite occurs. This means that, for the former, the longer
the maturity the greater the protection required against risks. As a result, the yield curve is ascending, as commonly
observed in developed countries. On the other hand, floating rate bonds have a negative yield spread premium over
time, as bondholders are immediately risk protected. These types of bonds have interest rates that are periodically reset
and, therefore, a bondholder need not require a higher premium because, ultimately, it will come.
Hence, changes in debt structure characteristics are not neutral and, as a result, affect the country’s yield curve and
influence economic activity. Changes in the composition of public debt reflect in the way investors demand government
bonds. This is so because agents change their portfolio over time in response to the opportunity costs that such new
structure, with different maturities and indices bring to strategic financial asset allocation. The role of sovereign debt
management and its transmission mechanism depend on the behavior of the yield curve and on how investors’ demands
are in relation to yield spread premiums.
For instance, spreads related to fixed rate bonds are higher on the long end of the yield curve, reflecting how agents
determine the present value of each future value of those bonds. In order for the long-term interest rates not to exceed
the opportunity cost related to productive investment, current measures are necessary to ensure inflationary and fiscal
stabilities in the future and, therefore, provide reduction of premiums on the long end of the yield curve. With such
a decrease, private funding, through debt issuance, becomes less burdened, making room for private investment to
step-in and grow. This draws attention to the importance of implementing credible economic policies. In this sense,
the recent public debt measures and management strategy are helpful because: (i) issuing fixed rate linked bonds
allows for the construction of an ascending yield curve, improving the monetary policy transmission through the
wealth effect; (ii) fixed rate linked bonds make fiscal policy more predictable, as debt service expenditures become
less volatile, bringing more fiscal stability. Thus, the results expressed in Fig. 5 help us to understand Brazil’s current
debt management strategy, which is aimed at improving the efficiency of monetary policy and also aimed at making
government spending more predictable. In both cases, there are important gains in terms of economic policy credibility
and in terms of making the long end of the yield curve flatter.
As for the floating rate linked bonds, they require lower spread premiums along the term structure of interest rates,
in line with the arguments found in Arida (2006) and Lara Resende (2006). These authors argue that floating rate debt
securities protect the holder and have a short-term maturity structure once their return adjusts periodically according
to the movement in the interest rates to which they are tied. Although the required yield spread premiums show that
floating rate bonds reduce systemic risk, they tend to compromise capital market and productive investment. There are
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wo reasons for this. Firstly, private funding becomes more costly, in terms of intangible opportunity costs as well as
perational borrowing costs. Secondly, floating rate bonds also replicate their short-term horizon to the economy as a
hole.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that the recent management of the Brazilian public debt, with a greater share of fixed
ate bonds and the attraction of a larger number of investors, can have a positive effect on economic activity. Surely,
he progress made in Brazil’s debt profile is highly beneficial to the dynamics of economic activity in the country.
.  Conclusion
The purpose of this article was to investigate the impact of the issuance of fixed rate and floating rate linked bonds
n yield spread premiums required by investors, when purchasing bonds with different maturities. The goal was to have
 better understanding of how debt management affects economic growth. The results showed that agents respond to
hanges in the composition of debt, meaning that its management can have real effects on the economy. The estimations
ade clear that the required returns increase over time for fixed rate linked bonds, but reduce for floating rate bonds,
s there is no wealth effect.
There is no doubt that increasing the issuance of fixed rate linked bonds, along with robust and credible economic
olicies, is the best strategy for a sound relationship between debt management and economic activity. The worst-case
cenario would be high levels of debt related to fixed rate linked bonds in combination with instability of macroeconomic
ariables, which could result in high interest rate variability and have an adverse effect on economic activity. That
as the case in Brazil in 1999 and 2003, when economic growth reached 0.3% and 0.5%, respectively. In fact, since
id-2000 the Brazilian public debt management has gone through important improvements, from a debt profile likely
o be deleterious for economic growth and development, to a more favorable one. Nonetheless, an optimal path of
overnment debt has yet to be reached.
Last but not least, our analysis can help understand how the stance of monetary policy can influence the debt
anagement process. On the one hand, the effect of lowering interest rates, which has been the case in Brazil until the
eginning of 2013, can be compensated, in an intertemporal strategy of monetary tightening, by the issuance of fixed
ate linked bonds with longer maturities. This would certainly promote more efficiency in the conduct of monetary
olicy, with the improvement of the debt’s maturity profile by lengthening the average maturity of the country’s public
ebt.
This opens up alternative investment options between fixed rate and floating rate securities, with different spreads
nd maturities that, in a way, would enhance the transmission mechanism of monetary policy in Brazil, via volatility
nd portfolio effects. Besides that, such strategy would also help the coordination between monetary and fiscal policy,
s the latter would become more predictable and less subject to sudden fluctuations.
unding
The author thanks CNPQ, FAPEMIG and PROPP-UFU for financial support.
eferences
gell, J., Persson, M., 1989. Does Debt Management Matter? Stockholm – International Economic Studies Series Papers No. 442.
rida, P., Bacha, E., Lara Resende, A., 2005. Credit, interest and jurisdictional uncertainty: conjectures on the case of Brazil. In: Giavazzi, F.,
Goldfajn, I., Herrera, S. (Eds.), Inflation Targeting, Debt and the Brazilian Experience: 1993 to 2003. MIT Press, Cambridge.
rida, P., 2006. As Letras Financeiras do Tesouro em seu vigésimo aniversário. In: Bacha, E., Oliveira, L.C. (Eds.), Mercado de Capitais e Dívida
Pública. Contracapa, São Paulo.
semota, O.J., 2010. Understanding the Kalman Filter: a classical approach with an application. Eur. J. Sci. Res. 45 (1), 6–15.
anerjee, A., Lumsdaine, R., Stock, J., 1992. Recursive and sequential tests of the unit root and trend break hypothesis: theory and international
evidence. J. Bus. Econ. Stat. 10, 271–287.
aum, C.F., 2005. Stata: the language of choice for time-series analysis? Stata J. 5, 46–63.
artolini, L., Prati, A., 2003. The Execution of Monetary Policy: A Tale of Two Central Banks. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Staff Reportn◦ 165.
loem, A.M., Dippelsman, R.J., Maehle, N.O., 2003. Quarterly National Accounts Manual – Concepts, Data Sources, and Compilation. International
Monetary Fund, New York.
oot, J.C.G., Feibes, W., Lisman, J.H.C., 1967. Further methods of derivation of quarterly figures from annual data. Appl. Stat. 16 (1), 65–75.
188 C.G. da Silva et al. / EconomiA 15 (2014) 174–188
Bresser-Pereira, L.C., Gomes da Silva, C., 2008. Inflation targeting in Brazil: a Keynesian approach. In: Wray, L.R., Forstater, M. (Eds.), Keynes
and Macroeconomics After 70 Years. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, pp. 176–195.
Carneiro, D.D., 2006. Letras Financeiras do Tesouro e normalidade financeira: haverá um “peso problem”? In: Bacha, E., Oliveira, L.C. (Eds.),
Mercado de Capitais e Dívida Pública. Contracapa, São Paulo.
Christiano, L., 1992. Searching for breaks in GNP. J. Bus. Econ. Stat. 10, 237–250.
Clemente, J., Montan˜és, A., Reyes, M., 1998. Testing for a unit root in variables with a double change in the mean. Econ. Lett. 59, 175–182.
Commandeur, J.J.F., Koopman, S.J., 2007. An Introduction to Space State Time Series Analysis. Oxford University Press, New York.
Dickey, D.A., Fuller, W.A., 1979. Distribution of the estimators for autoregressive time series with a unit root. J. Am. Stat. Assoc. 74, 427–431.
Favero, C., Giavazzi, F., 2005. Inflation targeting and debt: lessons from Brazil. In: Giavazzi, F., Goldfjan, I., Herrera, S. (Eds.), Inflation Targeting,
Debt, and the Brazilian Experience, 1999 to 2003. The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Franco, G.H.B., 2005. Notas sobre crowding out, juros altos e LFTs, Disponível em: http://www.economia.puc-rio.br/gfranco/LFTs.PDF (Acesso
em julho de 2012).
Filardo, A., Mohanty, M., Moreno, R., 2012. Central Bank and Government Debt Management: Issues for Monetary Policy. BIS Papers No. 67.
Garcia, M., Salomão, J., 2006. Alongamento dos títulos de renda fixa no Brasil. In: Bacha, E., Oliveira, L. (Eds.), Mercado de Capitais e Dívida
Pública. Contracapa, São Paulo.
Gomes da Silva, C., Vieira, F.V., 2013. Persistência Inflacionária Regional Brasileira: Uma Aplicac¸ão dos Modelos ARFIMA. Econ. Aplic. 17,
117–136.
Hamilton, J., 1994. Time Series Analysis. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.
Harvey, A.C., 1990. Forecasting, Structural Time Series Models and the Kalman Filter. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
Kawall, C., Robotton, M., Dupita, A., 2004. Política monetária e alongamento da dívida pública: uma proposta para discussão. ESAF, Brasília.
Koopman, S.J., Harvey, A.C., Doornik, J.A., Shepard, N., 2009. Structural Time Series Analyses, Modeller and Predictor. Timberlake Consultants,
London.
Kwiatkowski, D., Phillips, P.C.B., Schmidt, P., Shin, Y., 1992. Testing the null hypothesis of stationarity against the alternative of a unit root: how
sure are we that economic time series are non-stationary? J. Econom. 54, 159–178.
Lara Resende, A., 2006. Em defesa dos títulos de indexac¸ão financeira. In: Bacha, E., Oliveira, L. (Eds.), Mercado de Capitais e Dívida Pública.
Contracapa, São Paulo.
Lee, J., Strazicich, M.C., 2003. Minimum LM unit root test with two structural breaks. Rev. Econ. Stat. 85, 1082–1089.
Levy, J.V.F., 2006. Política econômica e alongamento dos títulos públicos no Brasil. In: Bacha, E., Oliveira, L. (Eds.), Mercado de Capitais e Dívida
Pública. Contracapa, São Paulo.
Loyo, E., 2006. Política monetária e alongamento da dívida pública. In: Bacha, E., Oliveira, L.C. (Eds.), Mercado de Capitais e Dívida Pública.
Contracapa, São Paulo.
Ludvigson, S.C., Steindel, C., Lettau, M., 2002. Monetary policy transmission through the consumption-wealth channel. Econ. Policy Rev. 8 (1),
117–133.
Mendonc¸a, H.F., Silva, R.T., 2008. Administrac¸ão de dívida pública sob um Regime de Metas de Inflac¸ão. Econ. Aplic. 12 (4), 635–657.
Moraes, P.B., 2006. As Letras Financeiras do Tesouro e o alongamento da dívida pública. In: Bacha, E., Oliveira, L.C. (Eds.), Mercado de Capitais
e Dívida Pública. Contracapa, São Paulo.
Pasricha, G.K., 2006. Kalman Filter and Its Economic Applications. MPRA Paper No. 22734.
Pastore, A.C., 1996. Por que a política monetária brasileira perde eficácia? Rev. Bras. Econ. 50 (3), 281–311.
Pastore, A.C., 2006. As Letras Financeiras do Tesouro e a eficácia da política monetária. In: Bacha, E., Oliveira, L.C. (Eds.), Mercado de Capitais
e Dívida Pública. Contracapa, São Paulo.
Pedras, G.B.V., 2009. História da dívida pública no Brasil: de 1964 até os dias atuais. In: Silva, A.C., Carvalho, L.O., Medeiros, O.L. (Eds.), Dívida
pública: a experiência brasileira. Secretaria do Tesouro Nacional: Banco Mundial, Brasília, pp. 57–80.
Perron, P., 1989. The great crash, the oil price shock, and the unit root hypothesis. Econometrica 57, 1361–1401.
Perron, P., 1990. Testing for a unit root in time series with a changing mean. J. Bus. Econ. Stat. 8, 153–162.
Perron, P., 1997. Further evidence on breaking trend functions in macroeconomic variables. J. Econ. 80, 355–385.
Perron, P., Vogelsang, T., 1992. Nonstationarity and level shifts with an application to purchasing power parity. J. Bus. Econ. Stat. 10, 301–320.
Pires, M.C.C., Andrade, J.P., 2009. Uma Análise da Transmissão da Política Monetária e o Canal da Dívida Pública com Aplicac¸ão aos Dados
Brasileiros. Econ. Aplic. 13 (4), 439–462.
Secretaria do Tesouro Nacional, 2012. Plano Anual de Financiamento da Dívida Pública Federal 2012. Secretaria do Tesouro Nacional, Brasília.
Shumway, R., Stoffer, D., 2000. Time Series Analysis and Its Applications. Springer Texts in Statistics. Springer-Verlag, New York.
Tobin, J., 1963. An essay on the principles of debt management. In: Fiscal and Debt Management Policies, Commission on Money and Credit.
Cowles Foundation Paper.
Vogelsang, T., Perron, P., 1998. Additional tests for a unit root allowing for a break in the trend function at an unknown time. Int. Econ. Rev. 34 (4),
1073–1110.
Zivot, E., Andrews, D.W.K., 1992. Further evidence on the great crash, the oil-price shock and the unit root hypothesis. J. Bus. Econ. Stat. 10,
251–270.
